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In Ancient Greek, an impolite order can be uttered by means of a 
negative interrogative in the future tense (οὐκ ἐρεῖς; ‘Won’t you talk?’). 
The aim of this paper is to understand to what extent this type of 
utterance is impolite, and to explain how such a conventional and indirect 
order can frequently take on an impolite meaning. For this purpose, data 
are taken from classical drama (Aristophanes’ and Euripides’ plays).  
Drawing on criteria put forward by recent work on impoliteness, 
this study provides an accurate description of uses in discourse, in order 
to establish that this conventional order is never used with a polite 
intention, but regularly as an impolite order. Impoliteness can be 
explained by the locutionary form which gives an orientation to the 
interpretation of the utterance: an indirect and conventional expression 
cannot be polite if the locutionary meaning is opposed to it. 
 
Keywords: Ancient Greek; future; impoliteness; negative interrogative; 
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1. Introduction 
In Ancient Greek, an impolite order can be uttered by means of a second-
person future, used in a negative interrogative sentence. This structure is 
frequently encountered in classical drama, in Sophocles’ and Euripides’ plays, 
and especially in Aristophanes’, but is less common, though not unknown, in 
prose (in his monograph, Magnien, 1912: 179–181, lists several examples in 
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Plato’s, Xenophon’s and Demosthenes’ works). The prototypical utterance is 
example (1): 
(1) οὐκ     ἐρεῖς       ; 
 Neg.   2nd p. Fut. (say)  Interrogative marker 
 ‘Won’t you say?’ (Ar. Ach. 580, Peace 185, Birds 67, etc.) 
In the literature, classicists have long noticed that these utterances tend to 
express impolite orders. See, for instance, Kühner and Gerth’s remark in their 
Syntax: 
Diesem gemässigten Ausdruck eines Befehls steht die durch eine Negation 
und den Indikativ des Futurs in der Form einer Frage ausgedrückte 
Befehlsweise entgegen, in welcher das Begehrte in strengem und drohendem 
Tone, zuweilen mit einer gewissen ironischen Bitterkeit ausgesagt wird. 
(Kühner and Gerth 1904: 387.7; my emphasis). [‘Contrary to this moderate 
expression of an order, there is another way of giving an order, expressed by 
means of a negation and the future indicative in the form of a question, in 
which the desire is uttered in a stern and threatening tone, sometimes with 
bitter irony.’ (own translation)] 
A similar opinion is expressed by Schwyzer and Debrunner, in their Greek 
grammar:  
Voluntativ ist die negierte futurische Frage (2. und 3. Pers.) in der Geltung 
eines strikten Befehls (Schwyzer and Debrunner 1958: 292; my emphasis). 
[‘The negated question in the future (2nd and 3rd person) expresses will, 
equivalent to a strict order.’ (own translation)] 
Nevertheless, these remarks are rather unspecific and need to be more firmly 
grounded. That is why the first aim of this paper is to analyse this impolite 
expression in discourse so as to provide a more accurate description of the 
utterances and their characteristics. 
Furthermore, Ancient Greek provides data which are of great interest as 
far as (im)politeness theories are concerned, since this utterance is an indirect 
act and a conventional one. The second aim of this paper is therefore to 
understand why a negative interrogative is impolite in the future tense, 
whereas the same form of sentence is polite with the potential (a regular verb 
form which expresses possibility in Ancient Greek): 
(2) οὐκ   ἂν   λέγοις   ;  
Neg.  Mod. Particle  2nd p. Potential (say)  Int. marker 
‘Would you say, please?’ (literally ‘Couldn’t you say?’) 
The data are taken from classical drama, since plays form an important corpus 
for verbal interaction. Two authors have been exhaustively studied, 
Impolite orders in Ancient Greek?   3 
 
Aristophanes and Euripides; the data were collected by reading these texts and 
comparing the occurrences with the lists given by Magnien (1912: 179–181). 
Why were these two authors chosen? As far as impoliteness is concerned, 
dramatic dialogue is a valuable resource (see Culpeper 1998), especially 
comedy (i.e. Aristophanes’ plays, in Classical Greek). In the classical period, 
beside inscriptions, which do not provide an adequate corpus for the study of 
verbal interaction, texts are mostly written in a lofty style, so that impolite 
utterances can be found only on rare occasions. In comedies, in contrast, 
colloquial expressions are not avoided, giving us insight into less formal types 
of language, though written with an obvious aesthetic intention. The οὐκ 
ἐρεῖς; type is not limited to Aristophanes’ plays, however, and since there are 
no other comic playwrights in the classical period, tragedy offers a useful 
counterpart.1 Among the three classical tragedians, Euripides was chosen for 
two reasons: his work is contemporary with that of Aristophanes and it 
contains the largest number of utterances of the expression studied here. In this 
corpus, the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type accounts for 146 utterances (106 in Aristophanes’ 
plays and 40 in Euripides’ plays), most of which are positive orders (133 
utterances of positive orders and 13 utterances of prohibitions). Line numbers 
for utterances are given in the appendix. 
2. Description of the data: Degree of impoliteness 
2.1 Identifying impoliteness 
When trying to apply pragmatic studies to an ancient language, several 
difficulties arise: there is no access to the opinion of the native speaker, nor to 
the criterion of intonation, and the only corpus that can be studied is what has 
been transmitted to us. Another difficulty occurs when the pragmatic study 
deals with impoliteness: as has been shown by various recent studies 
(e.g. Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann 2003), impoliteness is neither the 
negative mirror of politeness nor the lack of politeness. An utterance is 
impolite only if it is intended to be so. The definition of impoliteness adopted 
here is Bousfield’s (2007): 
[Impoliteness is] the issuing of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal 
FTA [face-threatening acts] which are purposefully performed  
 – unmitigated when mitigation is required and/or  
 – with deliberate aggression. (Bousfield 2007: 2186) 
Admittedly, it is difficult to sound out a character’s intention in a dramatic 
dialogue without running the risk of extrapolating. However, several clues 
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confirm the classicists’ opinion that the utterance is impolite, which derive 
from an accurate description of the data. For this purpose, instead of 
investigating the speaker’s intention, the hearer’s reaction has been studied 
whenever possible: thanks to contextual information, the modern reader can 
understand whether the impolite meaning is recognised by the hearer as 
intended by the speaker. The relevant criteria used for the description come 
mainly from the founding model put forward by Brown and Levinson (1987), 
but more recent research into impoliteness has also been drawn on (viz. 
Culpeper 1996; Bousfield 2007).  
In Brown and Levinson’s model, an order is a face-threatening act and as 
such can be assessed according to several characteristics concerning the type 
of face threatened, the seriousness of the threatening act and the presence of 
aggravating devices. All the utterances in the data threaten the negative face of 
the hearer, since the speaker insists on the hearer performing an action. In 15 
utterances, the positive face of the hearer is clearly threatened as well. See, for 
instance, example (3), which contains a prohibition. In this utterance, 
Strepsiades, an old man taught by Socrates, has just mentioned Zeus, and the 
philosopher, who is portrayed by Aristophanes as an eccentric who worships 
strange deities (i.e. the Clouds), snubs him: 
(3) Soc. Ποῖος Ζεύς ;  
    Οὐ   μὴ   ληρήσεις   ;  Οὐδ΄ ἔστι Ζεύς  
  Neg.  Neg.   2nd p. Fut.  Int. marker 
   ‘What Zeus? Won’t you stop talking nonsense? There is no 
Zeus.’ (Ar. Clouds 367; own translation)2  
In this prohibition, there are two different negations: the scope of the first one 
οὐ is the sentence (as in positive orders); the meaning of a prohibition is 
conveyed thanks to the second negation μή,  the scope of which is only the 
verb. In this utterance, the lexical meaning of the verb (ληρέω  ‘to talk 
nonsense’) entails a positive face-threatening act: using this order, the speaker 
expresses his contempt for the hearer’s previous words. 
Brown and Levinson (1987) define the seriousness of a face-threatening 
act by three factors: the social distance between the speaker and the hearer, the 
relative power of the speaker and the hearer, and the absolute ranking of 
impositions in the culture considered. These three criteria are summed up in 
table 1, which takes into account only utterances in Aristophanes’ plays (see 
below for remarks about Euripides’ plays). 
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Degree of  
intimacy 





threatening High Low S > H S < H S = H
35 71 43 63 74 10 22 
 
These figures call for some comments. The ranking of imposition is a difficult 
criterion even in a familiar culture (see Mills 2009), but especially when the 
observer stands outside the culture he observes. In the utterances which are 
considered here as “highly threatening”, the desired action intrinsically 
threatens a hearer’s face (such as ‘go away’ or ‘stop talking’). Among them, 
six utterances of curses can be found (Knights 892, Clouds 789, Peace 500, 
Lys. 1240, Frogs 178, 1209), which is an interesting possibility when 
evaluating impoliteness. There are only four examples (Ach. 166, 564, Knights 
240, Thesm. 1224) in which the ordered action could be beneficial for the 
hearer if the utterances are considered outside their context. However, 
contextual information shows that these examples are not intended for the 
hearer’s benefit in fact: 
• in Ach. 166, the advice is contradicted by an unpleasant term of address; 
• in Ach. 564, an explicit threat in case the desired action is not performed 
is uttered; 
• in Knights 240, the desired action is primarily for the speaker’s benefit; 
• in Thesm. 1224, the ordered action is claimed to be for the hearer’s 
benefit, but is uttered with a delusive intention. 
These remarks about the ranking of imposition are not conclusive as far as 
impoliteness is concerned: while the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type can be a neutral way of 
expressing orders, whether highly threatening or not, it can hardly be a polite 
form of order. 
As far as the relationship between participants is concerned, the figures 
about the degree of intimacy are given for the sake of description, but again 
are not decisive: in slightly over half the utterances, the speaker and the hearer 
are not on terms of intimacy, but in a significant proportion of cases the 
opposite situation holds, precluding any conclusion on this point. The situation 
is clearer in the case of the degree of power: the prototypical situation in which 
the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type is used is when the speaker has a clear superiority (e.g. a 
god vs. a human being, a master vs. a slave). There are only ten utterances in 
which the speaker is inferior (Ach. 165, 825, Knights 1354, Wasps 156, Peace 
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1054, Birds 1258, 1261, Lys. 874, 899, Frogs 649);3 in all these examples, 
however, the hearer’s superiority is questioned, sometimes aggressively. See, 
for instance, Birds 1258 and 1261: the speaker, Pisthetairos, is a human being 
who is addressing a goddess, Iris, the gods’ messenger. Given the extra-
linguistic situation, Pisthetairos is inferior to Iris. But in the play, Pisthetairos 
has founded a city of birds which competes with the power of the gods. When 
Iris comes as a messenger, Pisthetairos sends her away rather coarsely, even 
threatening her with rape if she does not leave quickly (lines 1253–1256). In 
this particular case, the hearer’s power is challenged with remarkable violence, 
but all the ten utterances are orders uttered in a context of challenged power. A 
sign of this superiority can be seen by the reaction of the hearer to the οὐκ 
ἐρεῖς; type: in 67 utterances, the hearer submits.  
While the description of the utterances given by table 1 does not prove 
the impoliteness of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς;  type, it nevertheless clearly indicates that 
these utterances are not compatible with politeness and are mostly to be found 
in situations of conflict (see the ranking of imposition and the degree of 
power). The impoliteness of the utterance itself is signalled by two clues: in 
Aristophanes’ plays, the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type is immediately preceded or followed 
by a threat (29 utterances), or it is accompanied by an insult or a face-
threatening term of address (20 utterances). Both features together are 
observed in nine examples (in bold in the list below): 
• with a threat: Ach. 564, 822, Knights 892, Clouds 789, 1296, Wasps 147, 
397, 448, 1340, Peace 261, 465, 500, 1124, 1126, Birds 990, 991, 1020, 
1032a–b, 1044, 1055, 1258, 1324, 1466, 1467, Lys. 1240, Frogs 178, 
Wealth 71, 417. 
• with an insult or a face-threatening term of address: Ach. 166, Clouds 
296, 789, 1296, Wasps 156, 397, 448, Peace 185, 1124, Birds 1466, 
1568, 1692, Lys. 429, 878, 1240, Frogs 178, 199, 480, Wealth 417, 440. 
These remarks do not mean that the majority of utterances are undoubtedly 
impolite; the figures only show that the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type is compatible with 
face-threatening acts which are highly aggressive. Example (4), where 




   ‘Won’t you fly away from here? Won’t you clear off, you most 
miserable rascal? Or you will soon see what comes of quibbling 
and lying.’ (Ar. Birds 1466–1468; transl. by Henderson 2000) 
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In this example, the rank of imposition is high (the speaker orders the hearer to 
go away, which threatens his negative face), there is no intimacy between the 
participants and the speaker is clearly superior to the hearer. The reason for 
this superiority is given by the informer himself: Pisthetairos is holding a whip 
(see line 1464). Note also the aggressive term of address and the explicit 
threat. The desired result is achieved: after these lines, the informer leaves the 
stage without speaking. 
Such violence, both verbal and non-verbal, is not sui generis and its roots 
can be found in the previous context: when the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type appears in the 
dramatic dialogue, it occurs in a situation of conflict and the speaker reacts to a 
face-threatening act. The previous face-threatening act can take different 
forms. Half of the utterances (53) are used after the failure of a first (polite or 
neutral) order, and, in 29 of these utterances, the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type is the second 
and slightly modified expression of an explicit order, already given in the 
imperative form. In 25 other utterances, the speaker orders an action which is 
expected by him and should have already been carried out. Lastly, the 
expression can be found after a provocative remark: in twelve utterances, the 
hearer has just said something foolish or coarse; in eight utterances, the hearer 
has threatened the negative face of the speaker (by stealing, beating or 
touching him); and in eight utterances, the hearer has threatened the positive 
face of the speaker (by a criticism, dispute, refusal, etc.). In these previous 
face-threatening acts, performed before the utterance under consideration, the 
seriousness of the threat varies: when the speaker orders an action which, 
according to him, should have already been accomplished, he can hardly feel 
highly threatened if this expectation was not clear for the hearer. Moreover, the 
features of the interactional context also play a role: when a previous explicit 
order has not been obeyed, the face-threatening act is all the more threatening 
because this previous order was given by a superior speaker. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that, when an utterance of the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type occurs, the 
interactional situation is not peaceful and friendly. 
In Euripides’ plays, the situation is slightly different. The description of 
the seriousness of the face-threatening act performed is given in table 2.  
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Degree of  
intimacy 





threatening High Low S > H S < H S = H 
22 18 20 20 26 5 9 
Table 2 shows that in Euripides’ plays the face-threatening acts performed 
through the οὐκ ἐρεῖς;  type are less serious than in Aristophanes’, and thus 
less likely to convey impoliteness. The first important difference is that the 
rank of imposition does not seem to be important: the figures are balanced 
between highly and not highly threatening imposition. Furthermore, there is 
not a single example of a curse in the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type. Nevertheless, note that 
only four utterances (Cycl. 49, Her. 562, 563, Phoen. 624) express an action 
intended for the hearer’s benefit; among them, only Her. 562–563 is not 
contradicted by contextual information (the other two are accompanied by a 
threat). As far as the relationship between participants is concerned, the 
situation in Euripides’ plays resembles that in Aristophanes’. As in 
Aristophanes’ plays, no firm conclusions can be drawn about the degree of 
intimacy between interlocutors, and the οὐκ ἐρεῖς;  type is used by speakers 
who are clearly superior to their hearers.  
This contrast with Aristophanes’ plays is confirmed by the description of 
contextual features. Indeed, the discourse situation seems less conflictual in the 
examples from Euripides: a threat is used in only eight utterances (Ion 163, 
174, 524, Hel. 437a–b, Ba. 253, 254, Rh. 684) and only three utterances are 
used with negative terms of address (Tro. 464, Hipp. 498, 499). However, even 
if the relationships between the interlocutors are friendlier, the utterance is 
used in Euripides’ plays when the speaker reacts to a previous face-threatening 
act, as indicated in the following list: 
• in 15 utterances, the hearer has not obeyed a previous order (Cycl. 49, 
Andr. 240, Heraclid. 840, Hipp. 498, 499, 780a-b, Hec. 1283, Her. 1053, 
Ion 163, 174, 524, Hel. 458, Orest. 171, Rh. 684), all of them rephrase 
the previous order;  
• in 25 utterances, an action should have been previously performed (all 
remaining utterances listed in the appendix, excluding the 15 above). 
In Euripides’ plays, the description seems to show that the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type 
cannot be associated with politeness, though impoliteness itself seems less 
probable than in Aristophanes’ plays. 
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2.2  Gauging impoliteness 
Are all the utterances of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type impolite? It seems clear in all the 
examples from Aristophanes’ plays that this expression is never used with a 
polite intention. In all the examples, where the expression is used with a threat, 
with a face-threatening term of address or, to a lesser extent, to reinforce a 
previous order which has not been obeyed, the impolite intention seems well 
established. Evidence for this impoliteness can also be found in the immediate 
context, as shown in example (5), where the reaction of the hearer clearly 
shows how threatening the utterance is. War, who is a god in Aristophanes’ 
play, is addressing his servant, Uproar (the Athenian pestle is an image for 
Cleon, the warmonger). 
(5) War  Οἴσεις ἀλετρίβανον τρέχων; 
  Uproar         Ἀλλ΄ ὦ μέλε,  
    οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν· ἐχθὲς εἰσῳκίσμεθα.   
  War  Οὔκουν παρ΄ Ἀθηναίων μεταθρέξει ταχὺ πάνυ ; 
  Uproar  Ἔγωγε νὴ Δί΄ · εἰ δὲ μή γε, κλαύσομαι. 
   ‘(War:) Run and fetch me a pestle. (literally ‘Will you run and 
fetch me a pestle?’) (Uproar:) But, my dear, we haven’t got one; 
we moved in yesterday. (War:) Won’t you hurry, go and fetch 
me one from Athens? (Uproar:) Of course, by Zeus; otherwise, I 
will surely weep.’ (Ar. Peace 259–262; transl. by Henderson 
1998, slightly modified) 
The verb in line 259, τρέχων, is a present participle, from the same verb as 
μεταθρέξει (with a prefix), in the future tense in the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type (in 
bold). The order in the form of the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type is the rephrasing of a 
previous order which has not been obeyed. The tone of War’s words is 
emphasised by Olson’s commentary in his edition (1998): “τρέχων: 
dismissive in tone and thus appropriate for dealing with a servant”. Indeed, 
Uproar submits and indicates that he has understood the threat implied by the 
order: he knows that there will be tears if he does not obey this time. 
Nevertheless, there are several examples where the impolite intention is 
debatable. When the speaker has a legitimate power over the hearer, the οὐκ 
ἐρεῖς;  type, though not polite, is not clearly impolite. The discrepancy 
between the participants allows such an expression. For example, in (6), 
Lysistrata is the leader of women who are on a sex strike in order to force men 
from all the cities to make peace, and she orders other women to struggle 
against men, and to push away the archers, who try to attack them. 







   ‘Forth to the fray, dear sisters, bold allies! O egg-and-seed-and-
potherb-market girls, ο garlic-selling-barmaid-baking-girls, 
charge to the rescue, smack and whack, and thwack them, slang 
them.’ (Literally ‘Won’t you charge? Won’t you smack?’ etc.) 
(Ar. Lys. 456–460; transl. by Henderson 2000) 
Lysistrata uses several phrases in the form of the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type, but with 
terms of address which are not face threatening. Her order is binding, but does 
not intend to be impolite.  
Indeed, in many cases, the impolite intention cannot be proved. Out of 
the 106 utterances of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type taken from Aristophanes’ plays, 57 
can be considered undoubtedly impolite if we take into account different 
features as described supra (extra-linguistic situation, contextual information, 
relationship between participants). Given these reservations, can it be asserted 
that orders of the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type are impolite? Some phrases or linguistic 
structures can be found both in polite and in impolite utterances, but there are 
expressions which are not possible in polite utterances (such as taboo words) 
just as there are expressions not possible in impolite utterances (e.g. “please”, 
except with an ironic intention). In the case of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type, it must be 
emphasised that this structure never occurs in polite contexts, and that in many 
cases, with a threat or a face-threatening term of address, or as the rephrasing 
of an order which has not been obeyed although the speaker is superior to the 
hearer, such an expression is intended to be impolite in order to react to a face-
threatening act previously addressed to the speaker. It is therefore compatible 
with impoliteness, but not with politeness. 
Given this limitation as far as politeness is concerned, a question arises 
since the utterance seems to be an indirect one and a conventional one, two 
features traditionally linked to polite intentions rather than impolite ones 
(e.g. Searle 1975: 59; Leech 1980: 109; Brown and Levinson 1987: 142), 
though this link between conventional indirectness and politeness has already 
been questioned (e.g. Leech 1983: 171; Blum-Kulka 1987; Culpeper, 
Bousfield and Wichmann 2003: 1549). It is noteworthy that with the potential, 
as has already been mentioned, the same negative interrogative sentence is 
regularly polite. The second part of this paper is thus devoted to the reasons for 
the impolite meaning of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type. 
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3.  Discussion of the data: Origins of impoliteness 
Though the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type is used as an order, its form is that of an 
interrogative sentence, which is the prototypical form of a question. Following 
Austin (1962) or Searle (1969), in speech act theory, one could say that the 
locutionary form is a question, the illocutionary force a directive act, and the 
perlocutionary effect impoliteness. Indeed, such an expression is an indirect 
and conventional order. 
However difficult the notion of indirectness may be, it is here described 
on the grounds of the morpho-syntactic complexity of the utterance, compared 
to the speech act performed. In an order with a form such as οὐκ ἐρεῖς; it can 
be claimed that the order is indirect because of the negative interrogative form. 
Without a directive illocutionary force, the negative interrogative is a way of 
asserting the idea emphatically. Indeed, the negative inverts the assertion and 
the interrogative casts doubt on it, so that the two markers counterbalance each 
other. When a negative interrogative is used with a directive illocutionary 
force, the hearer has to understand that these two markers interact in order to 
perform the right action. The negative interrogative sentence in the future is 
therefore less direct than an assertive statement in the future, which can be 
used with a directive force as well, in Ancient Greek as in many other 
languages. The οὐκ  ἐρεῖς; type is not only an indirect utterance, but also a 
conventional one: further to the 146 utterances from Aristophanes’ and 
Euripides’ plays, ten utterances of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type in the same corpus are 
not used with a directive force, eight in Euripides’ plays (Cycl. 632, Alc. 1089, 
Hipp. 459, Suppl. 1105, Ion 1308, Phoen. 547, Orest. 794, 1525), and only two 
in Aristophanes’ plays (Ach. 321, Clouds 1252).4 
Such a regularity tends to support a strong trend to grammaticalisation of 
this negative interrogative structure as an order: a conventional directive 
meaning can thus be assumed. 
3.1  About non-conventionalised utterances 
In order to explain the impoliteness of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type, the ten utterances 
which are not used as orders are worth considering for two reasons: 
• they indicate what the locutionary form of the directive expressions 
literally means; 
• they help evaluate to what extent the conventionalised utterances retain 
the literal meaning. 
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These utterances can give insight into the path of conventionalisation, which 
can help explain why conventionalised utterances tend to be found in non-
polite utterances.  
In example (7), one of the two examples from Aristophanes, Strepsiades 
has learnt some neologisms from Socrates, and, on the pretext of this new 





  Str.       Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ μ΄ εἰδέναι. 
   ‘(Strepsiades:) And do you ask me for your money being such 
an ignorant person? I would not pay, not even an obolus, to 
anyone who called the “kardopè” “kardopos”. (Creditor:) Then, 
won’t you pay me? (Strepsiades:) Not as far as I know’          
(Ar. Clouds 1249–1252; transl. by Henderson 1998) 
The example contains a real question since the particle ἆρ(α) (in bold) is an 
interrogative marker used in yes/no questions. A paraphrase of the utterance 
could be ‘Is it true that you won’t pay me?’, and even ‘Is it true that you have 
no intention of paying me?’, since the future is primarily intentional in Ancient 
Greek. The creditor has just been informed that Strepsiades does not intend to 
pay him, and he wants Strepsiades to confirm this intention. While 
commenting on this line, Starkie (The Clouds 1966) notes: “a negative answer 
is confidently expected”. Unlike the conventional directive meaning, the 
expected reaction is a verbal answer and not a non-verbal action. Indeed, the 
creditor’s answer fits this expectation. A very similar use can be found in 
Euripides (Orestes 795).5 
In several examples from Euripides’ plays, indeed, it is clear that the 
utterance is not an order. In example (8), the nurse tries to make Phaedra 
accept her feelings, her guilty love for Hippolytos, and has just reminded 
Phaedra that everyone, including gods, feels love. 
(8) Nurse  Σὺ δ΄ οὐκ ἀνέξῃ; 
  ‘But you, will you not resign yourself to this?’ (Eur. Hipp. 459; 
transl. by Kovacs 1995) 
The nurse cannot believe that Phaedra tries to resist her feelings and wants to 
show her that her reaction is unexpected. She wants her to confirm a statement. 
A parallel use can be seen in Euripides Phoen. 547. In such utterances, the 
speaker would like the hearer to perform the action involved, if possible, even 
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if the expected reaction is a verbal answer and not a non-verbal action. It is 
true that the creditor wants his money back, or that the nurse wants Phaedra to 
accept her feelings. In several cases, however, the speaker not only expects an 
answer, but also refuses the action to be performed, as in example (9), where 
the Phrygian, caught by Orestes and threatened with impending death, 
manages to persuade him to let him go. 
(9)  Or.  Εὖ λέγεις · σῴζει σε σύνεσις. Ἀλλὰ βαῖν΄ εἴσω δόμων. 
  Phry.  Οὐκ ἄρα κτενεῖς με; 
  Or.          Ἀφεῖσαι.   
   ‘(Orestes:) Well said! Your good sense is your salvation. But go 
into the house. (Phrygian:) So you won’t kill me? (Orestes:) 
You have been spared.’ (Eur. Orest. 1524–1525; transl. by 
Kovacs 2002) 
There is no point in assuming that the Phrygian wants to be killed. In such an 
utterance, the directive meaning is indeed impossible. The speaker utters a 
question about Orestes’ intentions (literally ‘you are not intending to kill 
me?’). 
Since the utterance can be interpreted as a question rather than an order, 
the hearer can feign misunderstanding in order to avoid obeying. In the second 
example from Aristophanes’ plays, example (10), Diceopolis is an Athenian 
citizen who has signed a personal peace treaty with several cities; the chorus, 
composed of citizens who do not accept such peaceful intentions, is beating 




   ‘(Diceopolis:) What black fire-brand has inflamed your heart! 
You will not hear me? You really will not, Acharnians? 
(Chorus:) We won’t listen at all.’ (Ar. Ach. 320–322; transl. by 
Henderson 1998, slightly modified) 
In this instance, Diceopolis asks the chorus to hear him: his intention is 
probably to utter a real order, but it is a debatable point since Diceopolis’ 
position is inferior. The ambiguous indirect form permits both interpretations, 
and it is even possible that Diceopolis gives the chorus the choice between the 
two interpretations through this form. Indeed the chorus, in a rather polemical 
tone, gives Diceopolis a verbal answer, and refuses to obey him. Such a 
reaction is possible since the locutionary form of the order is an interrogative 
sentence: one way of refusing to obey is to give an explicit verbal answer. The 
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comparison between this example (10) and examples (7) to (9) shows an 
important pragmatic difference, depending on whether the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type is 
intended as a question or as an order. In the literature, attention has already 
been paid to the pragmatic implicatures of oriented questions (e.g. Heritage 
2002; Heinemann 2006), but negative interrogatives are not only to be 
contrasted with interrogative (positive) sentences; their pragmatic orientation 
can differ according to the speech act they complete. In the οὐκ ἐρεῖς;  type, 
when it is used as a question, as in examples (7) to (9), only the action is 
within the scope of the negation, and the expected answer is ‘non p’. The 
utterance is therefore equivalent to ‘Is it true that non-p?’ ([οὐ p];). Indeed, in 
examples (7) and (9), the hearer confirms ‘non-p’. In contrast, the expected 
action is the referent of p when the expression is used as an order, since it is 
the whole phrase which is within the scope of the negation. This utterance is 
equivalent to ‘Isn’t it true that p?’ (οὐ [p];). 
How is the hearer made aware of these different pragmatic expectations? 
The context of the utterance plays an important role: in example (7), the 
creditor knows that Strepsiades won’t pay him, and in example (10), 
Diceopolis wants the chorus to hear him, so that the hearer understands that the 
creditor asks a question and that Diceopolis utters an order. Since the  οὐκ 
ἐρεῖς; type is often used as the iteration of a previous order, the illocutionary 
force is not difficult to understand. It is noteworthy that in all the utterances of 
the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type used as a question the speaker lacks power: this is the case 
for examples (7) to (9), but also for all the other examples. Given the hearer’s 
expectation about the reaction involved by the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type in context, and 
the unbalanced relationships between interlocutors, a frame for impolite orders 
could be assumed (see Terkourafi 2001). In fact, contextual expectations seem 
to play a more important role than extra-linguistic features, since an impolite 
order and a negative question (both in the οὐκ ἐρεῖς;  type) can be uttered in 
the same utterance, as in example (11). In this example from the Gorgias, the 
distinction between the two different pragmatic uses of the utterance is made 
perceptible. Socrates is addressing Callicles who questions the dialectic 
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 ‘Then, will you tell me in what things the superior and wiser man has 
a right to the advantage of a larger share? Or will you neither put up 
with a suggestion from me nor make one yourself?’ 
 (Plato Gorgias 491 a4; transl. by Lamb 1924) 
In the first utterance (οὔκουν  σὺ  ἐρεῖς; literally ‘Won’t you tell me?’), 
Socrates gives an order. The logical gloss of this utterance is ‘Isn’t it true that 
you will tell me?’, and, indeed, Socrates expects Callicles to give him his 
opinion. However, in the second utterance, (οὔτ΄ ἐρεῖς; ‘Won’t you tell me?’), 
Socrates asks a question, which is logically equivalent to ‘Is it true that you 
won’t tell me?’. The expected reaction is therefore quite different since 
Callicles is expected to answer ‘Indeed, I won’t tell you’. 
3.2  Impoliteness in conventional utterances 
In the light of this distinction between a (neutral) question and an (impolite) 
order, it is easier to explain why an order uttered in the οὐκ ἐρεῖς;  type can 
have an impolite meaning. The explanation is made perceptible thanks to the 
difference between the polite meaning of the potential and the impolite 
meaning of the future in negative interrogatives. One of the main reasons why, 
in early studies of politeness, indirectness was closely linked to politeness is 
that when uttering an indirect form the speaker provides the hearer with a line 
of escape: the hearer can deny the locutionary form, without coming into 
conflict with the speaker. The archetype of indirect acts, the utterance “Can 
you pass me the salt?”, is a conventional directive act: the hearer is expected to 
pass the salt. But, if the hearer doesn’t want to comply, for whatever reason, he 
is not obliged to be aggressive: he can limit his answer to the locutionary form 
(“No, I can’t, it’s too far from me”). The problem is that answering the 
locutionary form is not necessarily polite. This is probably the difference in 
Ancient Greek between the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type (‘Won’t you do something?’) and 
the οὐκ  ἂν  λέγοις; type (‘Couldn’t you do something?’), which are both 
directive. When denying the locutionary form, it is far more impolite to answer 
“No, I won’t”, than “No, I can’t”. The former is obviously a face-threatening 
act, since the speaker confirms that he will not perform an action, without 
giving any explanation, so that his choice seems determined only by his will, 
as with the Chorus in example (10). As a result, when a speaker chooses to 
give an order, using the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς; type, he utters an indirect conventional 
order which does not provide the hearer with a reasonable line of escape. 
In addition to the indirectness or the conventionality of an utterance, the 
meaning of the locutionary form plays an important role in the definition of the 
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pragmatic meaning, which includes possible impoliteness. In the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; 
type, the speaker asks the hearer to perform an action, using a locutionary form 
which is uttered in the future tense. Now, directive acts in the future tense are 
themselves not polite in Ancient Greek: they are binding, since they predict the 
hearer’s actions, and very often threatening. In example (12), with a directive 
verb in the future tense, Bdelycleon explains the warmongers’ politics by 
quoting their words: 
(12) Bd. Δώσετε τὸν φόρον, ἢ βροντήσας τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν 
ἀνατρέψω. 
  ‘You will give the tribute, or else, in a crash of thunder, I will 
turn your city upside down.’ (Ar. Wasps 671; own translation) 
In contrast, when using the οὐκ ἂν λέγοις; type, the speaker asks the hearer 
to confirm an action in the potential. Now, directive acts with this mitigating 
verbal form only assert the preparatory condition of the directive act, 
according to Searle’s terms (1969: 109). They are not binding and provide the 
hearer with an easy line of escape. 
4. Conclusion 
Classicists have long noticed that negative interrogatives in the future tense 
could convey an impolite order. Thanks to the development of studies on 
impoliteness, it is possible to provide stronger grounds for this impression: this 
type of utterance is used by a speaker who is in a superior position and whose 
authority is questioned. The οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type can be used when a previous 
order has not been obeyed, but different threatening acts may have been 
performed against the speaker. Frequently, this utterance goes with verbal or 
physical violence and, in the majority of examples, the hearer submits. With 
the help of all these features, these utterances exemplify the definition of 
impoliteness adopted here. Modern pragmatic theories can thus be successfully 
applied to an ancient language, even if the modern reader has to do without 
native speaker opinion. 
Furthermore, classical studies can provide us with data which are 
interesting as far as (im)politeness theories are concerned. The οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type 
is an example of an indirect and conventional utterance which can be impolite. 
More puzzling, a very similar utterance, the οὐκ  ἂν  λέγοις;  type, is in 
contrast a polite request. The comparison of the two types leads to several 
remarks. Firstly, the same syntactic marker (the negative interrogative 
sentence) leads to different preferred answers, depending on whether the 
Impolite orders in Ancient Greek?   17 
 
illocutionary force of the utterance is that of a question or an order. Secondly, 
the locutionary form of the utterance plays an important role in the elicitation 
of the meaning, even in the case of a grammaticalised, conventional utterance. 
The morpho-syntactic markers used in order to express a polite request or an 
impolite order are not identical: with the future, the utterance conveys an 
illocutionary force (an impolite order) in addition to the locutionary meaning 
(since the speaker asks the hearer to perform the action, according to the 
binding and predictive utterance). With the potential, however, the polite 
request is conveyed in addition to the locutionary meaning (the speaker asks 
the hearer to confirm the preparatory condition of the directive act). In the 
elicitation of the politeness or impoliteness of an utterance, it seems necessary 
to study indirect and conventionalised utterances by taking into account the 
locutionary form of the utterance. 
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1. It would be interesting to take papyri into account, especially for private letters, though 
Mayser (1926: 212–215) does not mention any order of the οὐκ  ἐρεῖς;  type in these later 
texts. It is a perspective for further research. 
2. In several editions, the question mark is not written for this utterance, and more generally 
for all the prohibitions, following the suggestion of Goodwin (1897: 101–103, 389–397). This 
choice is debatable and leads to considerable difficulties when a positive order (which is a 
negative interrogative) and a prohibition are coordinated. For discussion of the data and the 
difference with the expression οὐ μή plus subjunctive, see Rijksbaron (1991: 167–174) and 
Denizot (2009). 
3. In Frogs, the relationship between the god Dionysos and his slave Xanthos is rather 
complicated: in several passages, Dionysos shows his (expected) superiority, which is 
considered legitimate by Xanthos. Nevertheless, in this play, the god is a coward who lets his 
slave take all the risks, even by giving him his clothes, so that Xanthos, pretending to be 
Dionysos, takes advantage of the opportunity to give his master a bad time. All the utterances 
of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type are used when the speaker is temporarily superior to the hearer. 
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4. Although several of them are listed as real orders by Magnien (1912: 179–181). 
5. In this utterance, the particle ἄρα (with this accent) is used. All the editors (in OCT, Loeb, 
Teubner, CUF editions) choose the connective particle ἄρα and not the interrogative particle 
ἆρα. The same remark applies to example (9) (Euripides, Orestes 1525). 
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Appendix  
Utterances of the οὐκ ἐρεῖς; type with a directive meaning 
Aristophanes [Ar.]: 
Acharnians [Ach.] 165, 166, 283, 564, 580, 822, 825; 
Knights 240, 336, 338, 728, 892, 1198, 1354; 
Clouds 296, 367, 505a–b, 735, 789, 1253, 1296; 
Wasps 138, 147, 156, 397, 400, 448, 942, 1152, 1340; 
Peace 166, 167, 168, 169, 179, 185, 261, 274, 309, 465, 500, 950, 1054, 1124, 
1126, 1275; 
Birds 67, 225, 354, 990, 991, 1020, 1032a–b, 1044, 1055, 1258, 1261, 1324, 
1466, 1467, 1568, 1692; 
Lysistrata [Lys.] 383, 429, 437, 459a–c, 460a–b, 515, 731, 874, 878, 899, 
1240; 
Women at the Thesmophoria [Thesm.] 617, 689, 696, 697, 1224; 
Frogs 178, 193, 199, 201, 202, 298, 299, 339, 462a–b, 480, 524, 525, 649, 
1209; 
Assemblywomen [Ass.] 43, 1144, 1145, 1146; 
Wealth 71, 417, 440, 974. 
 
Euripides [Eur.]: 
Cyclops [Cycl.] 49, 242, 243, 632; 
Andromache [Andr.] 240; 
Heracleidae [Heraclid.] 840; 
Hippolytus [Hipp.] 498, 499, 780a-b, 1084; 
Hecuba [Hec.] 1282, 1283, 1285; 
Suppliant Women [Suppl.] 1104; 
Heracles [Her.] 562, 563, 1043, 1053; 
Ion 163, 174, 524; 
Trojan Women [Tro.] 341, 464; 
Iphigenia among the Taurians [IT] 803, 1424, 1425, 1426, 1427; 
Helen [Hel.] 437a–b, 458; 
Phoenician Women [Phoen.] 624; 
Orestes [Orest.] 171, 1023, 1346, 1622; 
Bacchae [Ba.] 253, 254; 
Rhesus [Rh.] 684. 
